Introduction
Traditionally, international law has barely paid attention to the democratic legitimacy of its most important subjects -States, having been concerned only with relations between States and not within them. Based on the classical concept of sovereignty, States were given carte blanche to choose their own polity. Confounded by ideological tensions during the Cold War, the widespread acceptance of a democratic polity founded on the rule of law as the ultimate constitutional model proved elusive. Diversity was the rule and in the mid-1980s, only one-third of all States could be deemed 'democratic'. 1 The lack of democratic State practice crippled attempts to impose democracy as an international norm (Section 2).
The neutral position of international law vis-à-vis a State's internal form of government changed only after the collapse of communism. In the 1990s, bearing in mind the experiences with the 20 th century fascist and communist dictatorships, a consensus on the democratic market economy as the sole feasible social structure emerged. 2 In this context, the question of whether the citizen could claim democratic governance, made headway 3 (Section 3).
The normative value of democracy has deeply influenced the foreign policy of a large number of States. Since the 1990s, part of the community of States considers respect for democracy a condition for recognizing a new State (Section 4). Indeed, for a number of regional international organizations, a democratic polity is a membership requirement and is seen by the members as indispensable for the organization's survival (Section 5). Whether, on the other hand, States can, on the basis of international law, go so far as to not only deny States their recognition or membership, but also to forcibly impose democracy, is doubtful (Section 6).
Finally, this paper examines whether international law itself is made in a democratic manner. The achievement of international law through treaties or custom, for instance, is inherently suffering from a democracy deficit, even though some remedies seem possible. Where democratic gaps in this formation of law are mainly situated in the relationship vis-à-vis the citizen, the undemocratic character of decision-making in international organizations primarily concerns the relation between States. Powerful States are able to use decision-making to their advantage by using all kinds of formal and informal mechanisms, inter alia in the World Trade Organization (Section 7).
Traditional international law: a 'stepmotherly' treatment of intra-state democracy

The concept of sovereignty
Classical international law, based on co-existence between sovereign States, left the State's internal public organization wholly to its will and whim. It accepted no external patronizing or intervention. In Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, it is stated that the Charter gives no competence to the UN or to the UN Members to intervene in matters that are substantially under the national jurisdiction of a State. 4 Defining a constitutional model is undoubtedly the nec plus ultra of a matter under the national jurisdiction. From that perspective, exporting the democratic model to so-called 'non-democratic' States is an impressive example of neo-colonialist arrogance and, thus, internationally unacceptable. 5 The clear prohibition of intervention in sovereign States is therefore not conducive to inserting the principle of democracy into the corpus of international law. This does not mean that international law rejects democracy. In the classic view, international law and democracy are simply not related, as international law is to remain neutral vis-à-vis any political model.
'Odious debts' and State succession
The neutral position of classic international law on democracy is illustrated by the transfer of debts from undemocratic to democratic regimes. As a contracting party, a State cannot call on its new constitutional structure so as to refuse to redeem debts contracted by a former undemocratic regime. While various authors have tried for some time to develop a theory on 'odious debts' ('dettes odieuses ') 6 , the continuity of debts, contracted on behalf of the State, is a wellestablished principle. 'Odious debts' are debts contracted by a despotic regime to strengthen the dictatorship and to oppress the citizens. Allegedly, since they do not serve the interests and needs of the country, such debts should not bind the State, but only the regime that contracted them. 7 See http://www.odiousdebts.org. Odious debts is an organization that particularly advocates debt relief for the Third World. Under pressure of the United States, the idea of odious debts was also raised in the aftermath of the war in Iraq (2003) . However, creditors proclaimed a moratorium on the relief of the debts contracted by Saddam Hussein.
survives. 8 Therefore, debts contracted by undemocratic regimes must be repaid, even if this extracts resources from the post-dictatorial reconstruction and endangers the viability of a fledgling democracy. 
Beyond State sovereignty: the increasing importance of democracy in international law
The democratic peace
Influential writings have long called for a democratic society as a basis for peaceful international relations. In 1795, Immanuel KANT envisioned the idea of a democratic peace: the republican polity would temper the demand for war by the States and make eternal peace on earth possible. 10 In 1917, during World War I, the link was made with international law. At the annual conference of the American Society of International Law Elihu ROOT, president of the Society, gave a speech entitled 'The effect of democracy on international law', in which he stated that democracy was an existential condition for international law.
11 Democracy was supposed to be at its heart.
ROOT claimed that historical experience had proven the failure of the Westphalian system based on sovereign equality. The peace treaties that followed the Westphalian Peace (1648) were systematically broken and could not avoid the large European wars of the modern age. According to ROOT, absolute national sovereignty could never be the basis on which an international legal system could be maintained and enforced. On the contrary, he concluded -somewhat optimistically -that democratically elected governments steadily dominated the international arena. ROOT saw in this breakthrough of democracy a remedy against the warlike claims of nations. Familiarity with the normative framework of the domestic democracy would enable States to honour international agreements. Autocracies that deny the rule of law at the internal level, on the other hand, will also not be eager to comply with their agreements at the international level.
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A parallelism can be perceived between the vision of ROOT and the present-day idea that democratic States almost never fight wars with one another. 13 In an open society the continuous militarization and the maintenance of an external enemy image would be impossible. Citizens would be unwilling to continue to sacrifice resources and youth for a war of aggression and would concentrate at most on defensive warfare. http://www.jubileeiraq.org, http://www.theweeklystandard.com 10 See I. KANT, Zum Ewigen Frieden (Erlangen, Fischer, 1984) . 11 See E. ROOT, "The effect of democracy on international law", in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1917), 2-11. 12 See also B. BOUTROS-GHALI, An Agenda for Democratization, Supplement to the Reports A/50/332 and A/51/512 on Democratization, 17 December 1996, § 18. 13 For a critical evaluation of this these see more particularly J.S. GOWA, Ballots and Bullets: the Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999). 14 See J.M. OWEN, IV, "International law and the 'liberal peace'", in G.H. FOX and B.R. ROTH (eds.), op. cit., 343-385.
The right to political participation during the Cold War
Despite classic international law's indifference to achieving intra-State democracy, notions of democracy gradually entered international law through the back door of human rights protection.
During the 20th century, the State's exclusive power over all its citizens' doings was eroded by the breakthrough of human rights. Aside from typical political human rights like the right to freedom of expression, assembly and religion, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ('UDHR'), proclaimed on 10 December 1948, also stated in its Article 21 the right to political participation. Every person has, according to this provision, the right to 'take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. ' 15 Since 'democracy' etymologically means 'governance by the people', Article 21 undeniably identifies political participation with democracy. The UDHR also defines the way in which the will of the people forms the foundation of government's authority. This authority should 'be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.' 16 Free elections would form the core of democracy. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR') 17 , which has been ratified on a large scale and is, hence, binding on the majority of States, retook almost unchanged the relevant provisions of the UDHR in its Article 25. Similar provisions can also be found in Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 13 of the African Covenant on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights.
The question remained, however, as to what the precise content of the right to political participation actually was, particularly whether effective political participation presupposes a multi-party system. While the Western liberal democracies claimed that democracy holds real freedom of choice, the people's democracies from Eastern Europe and the developing countries often opposed party pluralism. The people's democracies feared that parties would form themselves along ethnic lines and thus give ground to civil war. During the Cold War, the idea prevailed that a one-party democracy is acceptable under the ICCPR as long as different political factions had a voice in the party 18 , a condition most States could easily fulfil. The elasticity of the concept of democracy robbed it of all normative value in international law: democracy could mean everything and, therefore, meant nothing. 
Electoral democracy: the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other European Organizations
After the disappearance of the people's democracies in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the pluralistic party democracy seemed society's sole viable political model. This historical watershed was translated into United Nations ('UN') resolutions that are nonetheless imbued with the tensions between democracy and sovereignty. On the one hand, they identify liberal democracy as the one and only legitimate form of governance, but on the other hand, the classic principle of sovereignty and non-intervention has not allowed them to affirm an outright right to democracy. Certainly, in the mid-1990s, the opposition to elections as a symbol of democracy fell silent. The sovereignty argument continues to play its role, however, on the 'rule of law' side of democracy.
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Since 1988, the General Assembly has paid attention to democracy annually. Up to 1994 its resolutions on the matter possessed the title: "Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections". Thereafter the title became: "Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies."
In 1988 the General Assembly again drew attention to the provisions concerning political participation as provided in the UDHR and the ICCPR and emphasized its strong conviction that "periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the governed and that, as a matter of practical experience, the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms."
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With these words, the General Assembly held elections to be the core of democracy 22 . Through elections, political participation is assured, which in turn helps achieve fundamental human rights. 23 (1991), 194) . In the first years after the Cold War, the attention of the international community was only to the electoral side of democracy. 23 The UN General Assembly had at that time not paid any attention to the dialectic relationship between democracy and human rights. It is asserted that democracy cannot take root if participation rights, such as the freedom of expression and assembly, are not first constitutionally guaranteed (J. CRAWFORD, loc. cit., in G.H. FOX and B.R. ROTH (eds.), op. cit., 94-95). The negative experience with democracy in a number of previously totalitarian States led, in the 1990s, to more attention to the interrelation of democracy and the rule of law (see infra). preferences of other States." 24 No single political system or electoral method would be fit for all States. This limitation was taken up again in the coming years. 25 Remarkably, from 1992, the sovereignty caveat disappeared from the resolutions, after the General Assembly had asked the Secretary-General in 1991 to report on electoral assistance.
26
According to some scholars, this could suggest that the right to fair and periodic elections is acquired and that States can no longer resist it. 27 If so, the role of the UN is to enforce the practical and procedural aspects of such a right to electoral democracy.
28
The right to democracy got an extra boost in 1996 when UN Secretary-General Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI submitted An Agenda for Democratization to the General Assembly.
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BOUTROS-GHALI was convinced that a right to democracy existed and intended, through the Agenda, to clarify the opinio iuris which is required to have a new customary international norm established. 30 In the Agenda for Democratization, the Secretary-General stated, in a daring manner, that the purposes and principles of the United Nations were the basis for efforts to promote democracy and that the non-intervention principle of Article 2(7) of the Charter (supra, 2.1) and the absence of the term "democracy" did not oppose this. 31 The activities of the UN would not be aimed at enforcing foreign models of democracy, but to provide support and advice concerning democratization. Without 'grassroots' support, democracy would surely not be able to survive.
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The UN has taken its support task seriously. To make a successful democratic transition possible, it has, since 1989, monitored elections in a large number of countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. 33 In 1989, the UNTAG monitored the elections in Namibia before it became formally independent. 34 The conducted, applying the electoral law. In order to provide evidence of whether or not elections have been regular, national and international observers should be able to monitor them. 63 Failure to comply with the election rules must be open to an effective appeal. An electoral commission or a court can hear this appeal, but it is desirable that some form of judicial supervision is in place.
The Code of Good Practice does not express a preference for a certain electoral system, provided that the underlying principles of European electoral systems are respected. Both proportional and majority election systems are possible. 64 The Code notes that electoral systems cannot simply be exported from one country to another, without taking into account local circumstances. 65 However, one should also be careful when introducing a little used and therefore little tested electoral system. 74 The principles of the Draft Convention are similar to those in the Code of Good Practice, albeit some being more elaborated upon. 75 The Chairman of the ACEEEO transmitted the Draft Convention to the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with the hope that, together with the Code of Good Practice, it would become the foundation of a uniform European document. However, as indicated above, the Committee of Ministers thought it too early to draft a legally binding convention. In sum, it seems that while efforts have been made to draw up international instruments with guidelines for democratic elections, as of yet no binding document has been created with clearly defined rules. Surely, various international human rights conventions contain a reference to the right to participate and to fair and free elections, but there is no legally binding instrument that elaborates the basic components of a legal framework governing democratic elections. The ACEEEO Draft Convention has not (yet) been adopted, the Convention of the InterParliamentary Assembly of the CIS has not yet entered into force and there is as of yet no political will in the Council of Europe to transform the Code of Good Practice of the Venice Commission into a legally binding instrument. Nevertheless, these documents have at least a high moral value and it is conceivable that various principles laid down in them may at some point in time obtain a legally binding status as regional customary law, provided they are -unlike nowsupported by a consistent body of State practice in Europe.
At any rate, it should be noted that neither the UN nor any other international organization have an intrinsic competence to monitor elections. 78 Most States accept only occasional or ad hoc monitoring. States will indeed be tempted to accept international observers to legitimize the election results, but it remains an option and not an obligation. According to BOUTROS-GHALI, today a number of democratic procedures, techniques, practices and precedents that indicate the existence of a coherent entirety of rules exist. This would affirm a true international right to democracy.
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To BOUTROS-GHALI, the practice of election monitoring seems especially to be decisive. He considers that the pluralistic party criteria that are used by the observers of international organizations and, in particular, the UN appear to be a clarification of the vague provisions in human rights treaties concerning political participation (supra, 3.3.). Since the monitoring missions are approved by States that are a party to the human rights treaties concerned and treaty provisions also have to be interpreted in the context of any subsequent practice in their application 81 , it is not irrational to see the development of electoral standards as a more explicit formulation of Article 25 ICCPR. There does not seem to be any persistent objector against the use of these objective criteria. The occasional resistance against monitoring does not emanate from ideological resistance to the criteria being used, but rather from the fear of being limited in the attempts to rig the election results. 78 The UN has to receive a formal request of a Member State. In 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution entitled "a right to democracy". 82 The resolution itself was adopted unanimously, but its title was the object of a fierce debate. A Cuban proposal to remove the "right to democracy" from the title, was only narrowly rejected by a majority of 28 votes against 12 and 13 abstentions. In their opposition to the "right to democracy", the developing countries in particular expressed their fear of foreign interference. Without casting doubt on the principle of democracy, they stated that, taking into account the disparate historical backgrounds, different forms of democracy are possible. 83 Hence, resistance to the title of the resolution seems to reveal that there is no agreement on a true right to democracy. This is also clear from the 'Universal Declaration on Democracy' 84 , a declaration adopted by the Interparliamentary Council (i.e. a body of the Interparliamentary Union, an organization of parliaments of sovereign States, established in 1889) in 1997, and from the socalled 'Warsaw declaration', in which democracy is not stated as a real right but rather as an ideal and aim. 85 Arguably, resistance to the right to democracy is directed at the enlarged right to democracy and not the procedural, electoral democracy. Indeed, undemocratic regimes use elections as well, but only in order to legitimize themselves. 86 The factor that distinguishes them from the liberal democracies, is the latter's respect for individual freedoms. According to the liberal democracies, democracy as a form of government can only be legitimized if the right conditions for the execution of the people's will are fulfilled. 87 These conditions concern citizens' ability to make an informed and free choice, which is a priori impossible in a totalitarian one-party State. free choice is only possible if citizens have the right to freely express their opinions and to unite in political movements or parties. The 'right to democracy' resolution linked in particular the electoral democracy to fundamental rights and the rule of law.
In order to make democracy truly coincide with governance by the people, a sound institutional breeding ground is necessary. Democratization presupposes more than democratic elections alone; it also requires respect for the rule of law, human rights, minorities, social development and full integration of women in society. 88 To this end, a fully elaborated right to democracy would hold not one, but a bundle of norms like the right to free and fair elections, the right to freedom of assembly (especially in political parties), the freedom to deploy political activities and to express one's political opinion and the right to influence certain decisions. 89 However, as of yet, it appears that these rights, considered as a whole, are only protected on a regional basis, such as in the Council of Europe.
In conclusion, one can assume that, if democracy is understood restrictively as a form of governance in which the people elect their administrators, it is definitely a principle of international law. However, if considered as a form of governance that is guided by requirements of good governance, such as the rule of law and accountability 90 , State practice allowing us to identify a right to democratic governance is, at present, lacking.
Democracy as a condition for State recognition
The recognition of States is traditionally only dependent on the objective characteristics of statehood, like a territory, a permanent population, effective authority by a government and the possibility to engage in international relations. The question of whether authority is legal or democratic, is not considered. 91 By holding on to clear State criteria, consistency would be upheld, while dubious claims would be faced with rejection. 92 The consequence is that, in principle, recognition can be granted to undemocratic States, as the recognition practice during the decolonization wave proves. 93 To make these States turn to democratic reforms, the argument goes that the international community ought to use diplomatic or economic sanctions rather than deprive the undemocratic State of its statehood.
Regarding the European and Euro-Asian States that emerged in the 1990s of last century, however, the European Community/Union and its Member States used different standards, along with the classic criteria. Based on these principles, the EC Member States recognized the former Soviet republics. Conform the common declaration by the bureau of the Conference on Yugoslavia, the requests for recognition by the Yugoslavian republics Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were referred to the Arbitration Commission. Slovenia and Croatia were recognized by the then 12 EC Member States on 15 January 1992 96 , despite this Commission's negative opinion on Croatia. Macedonia obtained a positive opinion, but was not recognized by the EC due to a veto by Greece. It was nevertheless admitted to the UN on 7 April 1993. 97 After a reminder by the Arbitration Commission, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum, after which the EC Member States recognized the country on 6 April 1992. Other countries followed the recognition practice of the EC, although they did not explicitly make a reference to democratic requirements. 98 The recognition of the new States was made dependent upon their engagement to construct a democratic State according to the rule of law. In contrast to the classic amoral practice of recognition, EC Member States introduced moral considerations, an attitude that, previously, would be considered as an unacceptable intervention in domestic affairs. Arguably, the Member States used State recognition as an instrument of foreign policy and, therefore, forced democracy upon the former totalitarian States in order to stabilize the European continent. Indeed, democratic States would, taking into account the thesis of the democratic peace (supra 3.1), tend to peaceful international relations. 99 See on the shifts in opinions on criteria for recognition: R. RICH, loc. cit., 55-56 and 63-65.
It is at least unclear whether this new practice has even achieved the status of regional customary international law. A number of indices seem to point to the fact that the presence of a democratic polity is not the ultimate requirement for recognition. 100 It has been said that the cases of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia were sui generis cases due to the special historical circumstances on the European continent, and that the conditions for recognition would only apply in case of the disintegration of federal States. 101 Furthermore, the EC guidelines provide that the EC and its Member States take into account "the political reality of each concrete case separately." The scope of this sentence has been clarified in the case of Macedonia. After a positive opinion of the Arbitration Commission and the EC Member States' refusal in the framework of European Political Co-operation to recognize Macedonia, the EC declared that the new State was nevertheless established and that Member States could decide themselves on recognition.
102 In brief, it seems to be the case that the presence democratic institutions create a presumption of Anerkennungsfähigkeit, but that each Member State, when a common European position is lacking, keeps its own political freedom to proceed to the effective recognition of another State after balancing all interests.
Democracy as a condition for membership of international organizations
Respect for democratic principles exists directly or indirectly as a condition for membership in the statutes of a number of regional international organizations. 108 One can therefore assume that a democratic polity is a membership condition for the Council of Europe.
NATO
The European Union
In the European Union, respect for democracy is included in the Treaty on European Union ('TEU') itself. Interestingly, the EU provides for a sanction mechanism in the event that Member States violate democratic principles. 112 This democratic life has different dimensions: the principle of democratic equality of the citizens of the Union, of representative democracy, 113 of participative democracy, the social partners and the autonomous social dialogue, the European ombudsman, transparency of the working procedures of the institutions of the Union, protection of personal data and the status of churches and nonconfessional organizations.
Once States have acceded to the EU, they remain bound to comply with the democratic principles.
114 Article 7 of the TEU, inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam 115 , provides a controlling mechanism in case a Member State violates principles mentioned in Article 6(1) TEU. According to Article 7(2) TEU, the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government, may, acting by unanimity and after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State. After such a finding, the Council of Ministers can on the basis of Article 7(3) TEU decide by qualified majority to suspend certain membership rights, such as voting rights.
116
The Treaty of Nice added an 'early warning mechanism' to Article 7(1) TEU. When in the beginning of 2000, a coalition government involving a far-right party was set to get to power in Austria, the Union proved to be insufficiently armed to act preventively against possible violations of Article 6(1) TEU. The other 14 Member States turned therefore to bilateral sanctions outside the institutional framework of the EU. Pursuant to the new Article 7(1) TEU, the Council of Ministers can, acting by a majority of four-fifths of its members and after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, determine that there is a 'clear risk of a serious breach' by a Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1) and make appropriate recommendations to that Member State. The Member State involved has the right to be heard first. The Court of Justice has jurisdiction over this matter, albeit only with respect to the 'purely 110 117 When the Court checks whether the conditions for imposing sanctions are met, it can, however, also review incidentally the decision which found an infringement. The OAS is therefore only open to democracies. Moreover, the OAS Statute provides for a sanction mechanism similar to Article 7 TEU. An OAS Member whose democratically elected government has been overthrown, can see its rights within the organization suspended, according to Article 9 OAS Statute. The article is drafted in such a way that a suspension is a last resort: it only applies when all other attempts have failed.
119
The articles concerning democracy were elaborated upon in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 120 which was adopted on 11 September 2001. Article 1 of this Charter stipulates that American peoples have a right to democracy and that governments have the obligation to promote and defend democracy. Articles 22 and 27 meticulously set out which steps the OAS can take in case the democratic order in a Member State is overthrown. The steps range from diplomatic initiatives to the suspension of membership rights. Although the OAS has never effectively turned to sanctions, its efforts have helped support democratic structures in its Member States, inter alia recently in Venezuela. 
Universal international organizations
For most universal international organizations, respect for democracy is not a membership requirement. As has previously been stated, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter leaves the choice of the domestic constitutional structure up to the Member States. The UN does not require its Member States to be democratic; the only condition for UN membership is to be "peace-loving" (Article 4(1) of the UN Charter). All the same, since the 1990s, in the light of its ample nationbuilding experience, the UN does not hide its preference for a democratic domestic regime. Several UN bodies and specialized agencies have indeed contributed greatly to the processes of democratization in a number of countries. Importantly, in the Millennium Declaration, 122 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 September 2000, Furthermore, one should note that for a number of international financial organizations, respect for democratic principles and processes is a condition for financial support. 127 Since the beginning of the 1990s, for example, countries can only borrow from the International Monetary Fund ('IMF') and the World Bank provided that they 'govern well'. Originally, good governance referred to sound macro-economic policies. Yet later, it became clear that economic development could not be separated from the rule of law. Accordingly, the IMF and the World Bank introduced political conditions, such as respect for human rights and democratic empowerment, 122 A/RES/55/2. See http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. 123 Id., § 6. 124 Id., § 24. See, referring to the Millennium Declaration quotations, UNDP Thematic Trust Fund, Democratic Governance, available at http://www.undp.org/trustfunds/devgovttf.pdf. 125 Id., § 25. § § 27 and 28 also contain commitments with respect to support for the consolidation of democracy in Africa and the political and institutional structures of emerging democracies in Africa. into the lending conditions. 128 Rejecting good governance criteria became synonymous with rejecting the advantages membership of international financial organizations offers. 129 Democratic requirements, are, however, not always imposed. NEPAD ('New Partnership for African Development'), an initiative from African countries committing themselves to good governance, provides a fine example thereof. NEPAD enabled these countries to obtain considerable support from the G-8.
130
Pro-democratic intervention in international law
Western democratic States and organizations often insert democratic governance in their development assistance agreements or partnerships with developing countries. 131 The implementation of these agreements is then dependent upon the developing country living up to democratic expectations. This "soft" approach stands in startling contrast to the more forceful approach according to which States expose themselves to foreign intervention if they continue to violate democratic principles despite economic pressure brought to bear on them. This theory of 'pro-democratic intervention' poses significant problems under international law. or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." In combination with Article 2(7), which stipulates that " [n] othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State", the Charter has been construed to shield State sovereignty from being encroached upon by foreign interventions aimed at imposing or restoring a particular type of government. In spite of the general preference of the UN for democracy, to which its electionmonitoring assistance is testimony (supra, 5.5.), Member States would enjoy the right to choose an undemocratic political structure, however morally repulsive such a choice might be.
The traditional statist view vests all sovereign authority in the government of the State, be that government representative or repressive. Yet in a seminal article published twenty years ago, Michael REISMAN argued that, under modern international law, popular sovereignty has supplanted State sovereignty.
132 REISMAN pierced sovereignty's abstract veil and vested true sovereignty in the citizens of the State. Similarly, a few years later Anthony D'AMATO underscored that international law is about people and not about States. 133 This implies that the test for sovereignty is the democratic character of a State. Only elected governments are deemed to represent the people and their atomistic sovereignty. If a government is not elected, it can never embody the sovereignty of the State. Then, basing pro-democratic intervention on this premise is the next logical step. As only democratic States are bearers of sovereignty, any State has the right, even more, the obligation to overthrow non-democratic governments so as to restore the full sovereignty of the State. This would fit surprisingly well with the text of Article 2(4) of the Charter: pro-democratic intervention is not specifically directed against the "territorial integrity" of another State, and even contributes to the realization of the "political independence" of that State. As D'AMATO notes, the principle of sovereignty would only prohibit "territorial aggrandizement or colonialism". Law (1990) , 507). Interestingly, D'AMATO does not term the intervention favoured by him 'pro-democratic', but rather 'anti-tyranny', thereby referring to the duty to stop widespread human rights abuses, and, thus, to humanitarian intervention (A. D'AMATO, loc. cit., 519). 134 Id., 520. 135 See on the Reagan-doctrine and additional reading: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dr/17741.htm. elected government of which had been ousted by a Marxist junta. 136 Allegedly called upon by the deposed government, U.S. marines and paratroopers overthrew the junta within three days and re-instated the democratic government. Under President George H. W. Bush, the United States intervened in a similar manner in the Central American State of Panama (1989) in order to oust the military government, capture its leader, General Manuel Noriega, and bring the democratically elected leader to power. 137 In their positive assessment of unilateral pro-democratic intervention, REISMAN, 138 D'AMATO, 139 and TESON 140 stand rather alone. 141 In FOX and ROTH's landmark book Democratic Governance and International Law, BYERS and CHESTERMAN, discussing previous academic writing and State practice on the subject, meticulously refute all arguments of the proponents of a unilateral right to pro-democratic intervention under customary international law. 142 According to them, these proponents turn their wishes into reality and conflate legal and moral considerations. BYERS's and CHESTERMAN's argument boils down to the thesis that the invasions of Grenada and Panama prove exactly the opposite from what their proponents believe. Regarding the Grenada invasion, they refer to a letter by a legal adviser to the State Department, which emphasized the grounds on which the United States did not rely, namely an expanded view of self-defence, new interpretations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter or a broad doctrine of humanitarian intervention. According to the adviser, the United States acted upon invitation of the Governor-General of Grenada, upon a request to intervene from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and to protect nationals. 143 Attempting to legitimize the Grenada invasion under international law, the United States did not legally identify the opinio iuris in favour of a unilateral right to prodemocratic or humanitarian intervention. The legal qualification of the action of a State is, however, of utmost importance in terms of providing evidence of the opinio iuris necessary to establish the existence of a rule of customary international law. In this context, the International Court of Justice held in the Nicaragua case (1986) that a State, in casu the United States, needs to claim that its intervention, which it justified on the political level, is also justified on the legal level, in order to establish a new right of intervention regarded by it as existing in such circumstances. 144 A post factum legitimization, as proffered by legal academics, does not suffice to establish a right of pro-democratic intervention.
As far as the Panama invasion -which occurred after the Nicaragua judgment -is concerned, the United States again relied officially on other legal justifications, such as the protection of American nationals under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the fight against drug trafficking and the protection of the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty. Yet in the list of justifications also features, although not in the first place, support of democracy. 145 . However, the emergence of a rule of customary international law in favour of pro-democratic intervention was immediately opposed by the international community united in the UN General Assembly, which condemned the intervention in Panama as "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States", thereby explicitly referring to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 146 Very recently, in February 2004, the United States stood again accused of unduly interfering in the domestic matters of another State. When the Haitian president Aristide, who was ironically re-instated as the democratic incumbent by the United States in 1994 (infra, 6.4.), faced stiff domestic opposition against his corrupted, yet democratically elected, regime, he was allegedly forced by the United States to leave his country. 147 The United States dismissed the allegations. As Aristide had lost considerable support in Haiti anyway and almost all support outside Haiti, condemnation of possible United States intervention was scarce. On the very day that Aristide fled his country, on 29 February 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1529, authorizing the immediate deployment of a multinational interim force to stabilize Haiti. The Resolution did not feature any reference to outside pressure brought to bear on Aristide.
Pro-democratic intervention by invitation
The current prohibition of pro-democratic intervention in international law is concerned with an intervention to which the elected government of the target State has not consented. However, a State may not only lawfully use force in the territory of another State in the case of self-defence or Security Council authorization, but also when the target State consents. 148 in Africa, provided that they are swift and small scale. 152 In other words, he suggests that the right to pro-democratic intervention to re-instate an ousted democratic government upon its request, may amount to a rule of customary international law.
The crystallization of such a rule, however, requires strong support of the international community, as it derogates from the prohibition of the use of force, which is a norm of ius cogens.
153 Moreover, as is apparent from the Nicaragua judgment 154 and the Friendly Relations Declaration 155 , outside intervention in a civil war, in favour of any party, may distort a State's free choice of its political, economic, social and cultural system. GRAY argues therefore that intervention, pro-democratic or not, is permissible only if there has been outside subversion against the government, or in the case of domestic unrest short of a civil war. Unilateral pro-democratic intervention by a State or a group of States is, as mentioned above, not self-evident under international law. It is likely to be restricted to instances of unambiguous consent of the target State. Pro-democratic intervention authorized by the UN Security Council, on the other hand, has proven less contentious. Prima facie it does not sit uneasy with Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, as the principle of non-intervention in domestic matters contained in this article "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Yet, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can only take measures in case of a threat to international peace and security. 157 A contrario, the Security Council cannot intervene to enforce democracy in a UN Member State, as the choice of the type of government is essentially a domestic matter and therefore presumably does not pose a threat to international peace and security. However, under a broad interpretation of such a threat, the overthrow of a democratic government may jeopardize international peace and security, in that it may bring about refugee flows or hostile conduct of the unelected government toward neighbouring States. 158 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on the white minority governments of what was then Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, chiefly on the grounds of the right to self-determination of the majority, although there might have been spill-over effects, or perhaps entirely unconnected actions, threatening international peace and security, such as the former Rhodesia violating the territorial sovereignty of other States, and South Africa developing nuclear weapons. 159 Terming these sanctions 'pro-democratic' is, at any rate, not correct, as they were concerned with the right to self-determination of colonial peoples, 160 a right that, as Russell MILLER recently argued, might contribute to the sheer demise of democracy. 161 In 1993, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Haiti, after its democratically elected President Aristide was overthrown by a military junta in 1991. 162 The Council deplored that, "despite the efforts of the international community, the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide ha [d] not been reinstated." Although the Council was also concerned "that the persistence of this situation contribute [d] to a climate of fear of persecution and economic dislocation which could increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member States", it was clear that these spill-over effects were too minimal to establish a threat to international peace and security as commonly perceived. Therefore, the Security Council determined that measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were warranted "in these unique and exceptional circumstances." In 1994, after the embargo failed to force the coup leaders to step down, the Security Council authorized the UN Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President. A force, mainly consisting of United States troops, acted upon the UN mandate and re-instated President Aristide.
It could be questioned whether or not the Haiti intervention was a watershed. For one thing, the Security Council may have listed in its resolutions circumstances that point to humanitarian rather than pro-democratic intervention. 163 For another, the deposed government of Haiti had invited the UN to re-instate it, and had, thus, given its consent to intervention. 
Multilateral pro-democratic intervention authorized by regional international organizations
Multilateral intervention is not always authorized by the Security Council. Regional security organizations may as well be tempted to enforce democracy by forcible means. In 1997, the elected government of Sierra Leone was overthrown by the so-called Armed Forces Revolutionary Committee. The coup d'état was condemned by the Organization for African Unity ('OAU'), which called for the "immediate restoration of constitutional order" and appealed to the Economic Community of West African States ('ECOWAS'), of which Sierra Leone is a Member State, "to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to 159 163 BYERS and CHESTERMAN note that humanitarian intervention was considered more important, because it was mentioned earlier in the preamble. See M. BYERS and S. CHESTERMAN, loc. cit., 287. Such a reading is, however, difficult to reconcile with the "unique and exceptional circumstances" that the Security Council found in the Haiti case. Indeed, in 1992, the Security Council had already espoused the concept of humanitarian intervention so as to intervene in Somalia (UNSC Res. 733 (1992)). 164 See supra. the country." 165 The OAU did not specify what means of assistance ECOWAS could employ. ECOWAS construed the mandate to imply the use of force and, through the West African peacekeeping mission known by the acronym ECOMOG, militarily enforced the embargo imposed on Sierra Leone. 166 Thereupon, the Security Council expressed its strong support for the efforts of ECOWAS and authorized the organization, acting under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, post factum to ensure the implementation of the embargo. 167 In February 1998, Nigerian ECOMOG forces invaded Sierra Leone, an action that was again endorsed post factum by the Security Council. 168 On 10 March 1998, the democratically elected leader of Sierra Leone resumed his powers, after which the embargo was lifted 169 and the Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone ('UNOMSIL'). (2000), 173 which provides for the condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government, the suspension of rights of the illegitimate government and the imposition of sanctions, ECOWAS seems to be, more than ever, willing to wield the sword of pro-democratic intervention in case of the overthrow of the constitutional order in its Member States.
A similar document as the ECOWAS Protocol is the African Union's Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Peace and Security Council, which was adopted on 9 July 2002 by 53 African States. 175 This Protocol entered into force in May 2004 and has as one of its objectives the promotion and encouragement of democratic practices as part of efforts for preventing conflicts. 176 However, the African Union has no right to intervene in a Member State, except in the case of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
177 Short of direct democratic intervention, the Peace and Security Council may institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a Member State.
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As regional organizations willing to intervene in support of democracy, ECOWAS is joined by the OAS and the OSCE, although the latter organizations have never actually exercised their power to enforce democracy in their Member States. 184 This could imply that the OSCE and its 55 Member States have, on the basis of this document, the legal authority to enforce democracy in other Member States, many of which are not renowned for their democratic stability. It should be noted that the Copenhagen Document is merely a political declaration that does not set out any decision-making mechanism.
It is likely that neither the OAS Democratic Charter nor the OSCE Copenhagen Document can be termed pro-democratic invasion pacts since they lack the explicit endorsement of military intervention. In view of the strict interpretation of the international rules governing the use of force, the former instruments may not imply a right of pro-democratic intervention. Even if they do, the legality of pro-democratic invasion remains doubtful.
ROTH for instance asserts that they may run afoul of the right to self-determination, i.e. a norm of ius cogens. 185 Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), treaties may not violate norms of ius cogens.
186 ROTH makes the argument that sovereignty is not a continuum: a State is sovereign or it is not. 187 Although the State can waive some sovereign rights, it could not erode beforehand the core of sovereignty, which would include the right to choose freely, at any given moment, its particular type of government.
188 Pro-democratic invasion pacts should therefore not be agreed upon a priori, but remain subject to the contemporaneous consent of the government. ROTH points out that the presumption of a pro-democratic invasion pact that a coup d'état is against the contemporaneous consent, is untenable, as " [i] It is submitted that this view incorrectly equates the right of a State to choose its particular type of government freely with the right to self-determination as a norm of ius cogens. Admittedly, in the East Timor case, the International Court of Justice ascribed an erga omnes character to the right of self-determination and recognized that it was one of the essential principles of contemporary international law. 190 Yet the right of self-determination -which is a right of peoples 191 -does not preclude States from freely entering into international commitments to (help to) uphold the democratic nature of their political systems and of the political system of other States that have freely decided to be part of the organization in question. This being said, the precise determination of what constitutes the 'democratic order' of the State in question may be a thorny issue: in that respect, one can only plead for the large view of democracy, as developed above (supra, 3.4.), to be taken as the frame of reference by the organizations concerned.
The democratic deficit of normative processes in international law
As has become clear from the above, international law is gradually evolving towards a positive assessment of intra-State democracy. Yet as regards democratic participation of both citizens (vertical democracy) and States (horizontal democracy) in intergovernmental law-making, much remains to be done. Feeble participation of parliamentary assemblies (vertical democracy) in the making of international law, as well as the lack of control over the actions of the executive branch, are testimony to this. Horizontal, inter-State democracy refers to the equal rights of all States participating in international law-making. Since their independence, developing countries have striven for effective participation in international law-making. 192 Industrial countries are, not surprisingly, reluctant to hand over the leading role that they have always played in the treatymaking process and in international organizations. 193 7.1. Democracy in the treaty-making process It may be obvious that every State has the right to participate in the treaty-making process. This participative model is, however, a rather recent phenomenon. Traditionally, only the great powers were invited to international conferences. Smaller States had to abide by the results of these gatherings. 194 These days, conference rules provide for the equal treatment of all parties to the treaty, albeit only for the formal consultations.
This being said, equal treatment of sovereign States only addresses horizontal democratic participation. What about the participation of the citizen and his or her representatives in international law-making?
A State is a legal person which, like all legal entities, needs a mandated physical person to enter into legal relations. International treaty practice, therefore, needs a State representative to make agreements binding on the State under international law. International law does not require the State representative to be democratically legitimized. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not determine the origin of the mandate; some State representatives are even exempt from submitting any mandate. 195 It is important to note for domestic democracy that the adoption of a treaty does not bind a State per se. In international law, a State can use various methods to express its consent to be bound. 196 In democratic States, a treaty is often subject to parliamentary consent prior to its ratification. 197 Yet a direct democratic legitimation is not a prerequisite of the international law of treaties. Besides, the parliamentary assembly can not amend the treaty; it can merely approve or reject it as a whole.
198 Accordingly, unlike with respect to domestic law-making, a parliamentary assembly giving its consent to a treaty does not have full legislative powers. 199 In this context, even democratic States suffer from a considerable democratic deficit.
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International law probably grapples with an inevitable democratic deficit. Much more than national law-making, international law-making results from a process of giving and taking. Multilateral treaties are often made during diplomatic conferences in which dozens of States participate. After laborious negotiations, consensus should be reached over a text that satisfies all parties, but that naturally fails to meet all their original demands. 201 In the domestic legal order, on the other hand, law-making results from a unilateral legislative decision. Under the theory of popular sovereignty, the law is then thought to reflect the will of the people. In the international legal order, this domestic volonté générale is replaced by the consensus of the parties. Equating the will of the parties with the will of the people is, however, not straightforward, as the executive branch carries out the treaty-making mandate delegated to it by legislative branch, which only in turn represents the people. In practice, the executive branch may attach weight to considerations other than the interests of the people it is believed to represent.
It could be argued, minimalistically, that international law-making is democratic, because the sovereign people have constitutionally authorized their representatives to limit democratic participation as the emanation of popular sovereignty. Yet such a comprehensive a priori mandate probably does not suffice in the current globalized world, in which so many inter-State decisions are taken. Such a mandate would limit active democratic involvement to an ever narrowing base of exclusively intra-State matters.
Neither does the argument that diplomats work under the authority of a democratically elected minister provide international law-making sufficient legitimacy. The activities and preferences of diplomats are often remote from the opinions of the citizens. 202 This distance may constitute the essence of the democratic deficit in international decision-making. In order to better involve citizens, their directly elected parliamentary delegates ought to participate in international law- 198 With the possible qualification that it can insist on certain reservations to be made, if of course such reservations are allowed under the treaty. 199 Parliamentary intervention enhances the domestic democratic character of international law-making. Yet, paradoxically, it may run counter to the realization of international democracy. Often, a treaty only takes effect after ratification by a substantial amount of treaty parties. Accordingly, if national parliaments refuse to approve a treaty, it may not take effect. Although States have democratically reached a consensus on an international conference, they remain dependent on the uncertain outcome of a domestic parliamentary debate. See M.C.W. PINTO, loc. cit., 1263-65. 200 International treaty law does not take domestic democratic concerns of the parties to the treaty into account. When a State bypasses its parliamentary assembly in the treaty-making process, the assembly has no recourse under international law. Indeed, a party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties qualifies this rule in that a State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 201 See D. SCHINDLER, loc. cit., 616. According to Article 9 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a two third majority now suffices to adopt a treaty text. 202 See M.C.W. PINTO, loc. cit., 1288.
making. These delegates could either be part of the official delegation of the State or region, or be involved in the preparation of conference positions. 203 Spontaneous international law-making, however, excludes such democratic participation. Norms of customary law and ius cogens are made in the absence of a formal decision-making procedure. Whereas, to be true, a State may object to the crystallization of a norm of customary international law on the basis of the persistent objector rule, 204 possibly after a domestic democratic debate, ius cogens is imposed on any State, without the possibility of objecting. 205 The lack of participation in the making of these norms would, according to some authors, question their democratic legitimacy. 206 
Democracy in international organizations
International organizations often shun basic democratic principles. Although the democratic principle of one-State-one-vote, a transposition of the domestic principle of one-citizen-one-vote, is mostly followed in plenary organs of international organizations, typically only non-plenary executive organs acting on behalf of the whole membership can effectively take decisions. Citizens of States having no seat in these bodies, have almost no control over their decisionmaking. As there is often no review by the general assembly of the organization either, this might to lead to a serious legitimacy and accountability crisis within the organization concerned. 207 In an analysis mainly applicable to decision-making in international organizations, SCHINDLER believes that genuine democracy can only thrive in a closed community ('Volksgemeinschaft'), the constituent parts of which are ready to accept majority decisions as decisions reached by the community as a whole. 208 The international community is, in SCHINDLER's view, no such closed community, but lumps together atomistic subjects with various interests. Their lack of solidarity would be a stumbling block to the unconditional acceptance of the majority's decision. SCHINDLER points to the difficulties encountered by the European Union in extending qualified majority voting. Also in other international organizations, qualified majority voting raises eyebrows. Most international organizations decide by consensus, e.g. the World Trade Organization ('WTO'; infra, 7.3.). A number of organizations, however, apply rules of weighted voting or qualified majority voting, chiefly to protect powerful States from domination by the majority. In the IMF, the five richest economies have, on the basis of their capital subscriptions, almost half of the total votes in the executive body. The IMF's Articles of Agreement even provide for so-called 'supermajorities' for a number of decisions, ranging from 70% to 85 %. This enables the United States to block important lending decisions. 209 Article 27 of the UN Charter also provides for a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council: each member has one vote, but decisions on matters of substance are only adopted when nine members, including the permanent members, vote in favour. 210 It should be noted that consensusbased decision-making or qualified majority-voting is not necessarily at odds with democratic principles, as a host of democratic State constitutions themselves provide for stricter majority requirements in order to protect minorities. 211 At any rate, attempts at re-inforcing international democracy often meet with stiff resistance from a minority of powerful States. These States are willing to co-operate internationally provided that the statute of the international organization concerned offers them procedural safeguards against the actions of a majority of less powerful States. 212 Abolishing these safeguards could jeopardize the existence of the international organization in the long run, since influential States would not be inclined to give other States an equal say over the resources put at the disposal of the organization by the former States. This might undermine the efficiency of the organization, as evidenced by the inglorious demise of the League of Nations.
A case-study: the democracy deficit in the World Trade Organization
The WTO, while still a relatively young international organization (it was established in 1995), has nevertheless become one of the most heavily criticized organizations at the international level. The rules for international trade that exist within the framework of the organization have proven to interact intensively with non-trade policies by governments and principles of international law (like, for instance, human rights principles and rules of international environmental law). 213 In the light of the considerable impact of WTO rules and rulings on dayto-day policy-making by States and eventually on citizens' lives, there is a growing unease about the (real or imagined (infra)) lack of democracy within the WTO. This is shown sufficiently by the bitter protests at the time of meetings of the WTO's Ministerial Conference, such as the ones in Seattle (1999) and Cancún (2003) . Criticism of the WTO is aimed at both the political (the way agreements are being reached) and the judicial (the dispute settlement system) branch of the WTO. This short case-study may point to the different aspects of democratic participation (horizontal and vertical) within a powerful international organization. 214 It has been suggested that requiring a minimal level of democratic practice from WTO Members could possibly help to further democratize the WTO. 215 This would, however, be problematic if applied to a number of current Members. It also remains a question whether a WTO Member should be sanctioned when it violates democratic standards. The ambivalent reaction of EU Member States to the participation of a far-right party to a coalition government in Austria in the beginning of 2000 (supra, 5.3.) shows how difficult this can be. 216 One criticism aimed at the WTO's political branch, is that it is an institution that only represents wealthy countries' interests, and one in which poorer countries have very little influence. Horizontal democratic participation (see supra 7.1) cannot be achieved since only a few countries dominate the political branch. In principle, decisions are reached within the WTO when every Member agrees to the new agreement. Normally, the decision-making process works by consensus. This supposes that there will never be a vote on an agreement: it will be adopted if no Member opposes. Only when a consensus cannot be reached, will there be a vote. An agreement will, in that case, be accepted when a simple majority has been reached. 217 Every Member has one single vote, a decision-making rule which, in principle, should guarantee the equality of all Members. Yet, as consensus should be reached, every Member government can potentially veto decisions with which it does not agree 218 and will have to be persuaded to accept the proposed agreement.
This immediately suggests that the GATT/WTO negotiation rounds are extremely sensitive to power-talk and intimidation. According to Jeffery ATIK, the relevant power not only includes economic power (e.g. the size of a country's market), but also power in other spheres. Through intra-WTO linkages (i.e. the linkages in the 'package' of negotiations such as e.g. trading market access for textiles in exchange for pharmaceutical patent recognition) and more subtle exertions of influence, bargains are structured. 219 'The display of power within the WTO rounds, the chief side for WTO law-making, has little to do with democracy.' Display of power within the WTO can take different shapes. Often an agreement, between the four most important industrialized nations (the 'quad': US, EU, Canada and Japan 221 ) (frequently negotiated in so-called 'green rooms' in the WTO in Geneva) is necessary before the WTO can proceed on certain issues.
222 These large, industrialized nations then try to find support for their proposals with smaller nations.
In the run-up to the most recent Ministerial Conference in Cancún, the US and EU, realizing that striking an agreement on agriculture would be one of the main issues, agreed on a common position in order to preserve their interests. 223 Moreover, the richer the country, the more resources it has to defend and support its proposals and positions. Often, developing countries do not have enough civil servants to attend all WTO meetings, let alone to prepare them sufficiently. 224 Since, in the case of decision-making by consensus, a decision is agreed upon as soon as no Member present in the meeting opposes, this does not guarantee the rights of the Members that are absent. 225 The fact that there are no objections by Members present, does not necessarily mean that a majority of countries agree.
These examples make clear that, even when there seem to be strong formal guarantees for equality among nations, in practice this might turn out differently. Therefore, some proposals have been formulated to reduce the consensus requirement in WTO decision-making and shift to majority voting. Surely, de facto, the consensus rule primarily protects the interests of the developed countries against a possible alliance of developing countries. 'The thinly veiled scare here is that the United States would be regularly outvoted on important matters, much as the United States is routinely disappointed by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.' 226 However, it might seem that this imbalance of powers between richer and poorer countries within the WTO is slowly changing.
Efforts to remedy developing countries' lack of resources have been undertaken. WTO technical co-operation has been set up to help developing countries (and countries in transition from centrally planned economies) operate successfully in the multilateral trading system. 227 In addition, politically, it seems that changes are occurring though they fluctuate and are not necessarily permanent. The most recent and most striking illustration of this is the failed Ministerial Conference in Cancún. A coalition of developing countries, coordinated by Brazil, refused to accept the proposals on the table. It is clear that if developing countries can combine their interests, they can effectively form a counterbalance to the powers of the richer countries. It must be said, however, that this coalition 228 seems to be slowly falling apart.
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Criticism is also often aimed at the lack of vertical democratic participation in the WTO. Citizens in the States that are Members of the WTO have the feeling that by agreeing -through their parliaments -to become Members of the WTO, they have given away some autonomous policymaking. While this is not uncommon in international relations (agreeing to a treaty necessarily means that a country is no longer pursuing certain policy objectives in a unilateral manner, but is taking into account the interests of other parties to the treaty), in the case of the WTO, the transfer of domestic powers is particularly sensitive. The matters that the WTO deals with appear to most people as highly abstract. negotiate the agreements are responsible to a democratically elected minister. However, as it is explained above (supra, 7.1.), this formal legitimacy is mostly insufficient to guarantee effective democratic participation by the people in decision-making that directly affects them. The fact that national parliaments have the power to approve or reject an agreement that is the outcome of WTO negotiations is not an appropriate and effective safeguard. 232 According to Robert HOWSE, the ex post legislature control is defunct. Indeed, this control has limited effectiveness. 233 As explained above, parliaments do not have the option to amend the agreement resulting from WTO negotiations. Since negotiation is done through "packages" 234 , the rejection of the package because of one contentious issue will immediately mean a rejection of all other components that might be very advantageous for the country. This undoubtedly puts pressure on the parliaments to approve. Since the negotiating agents have considerable agendasetting ability, they are able to combine components in such a way that the parliament has no other choice than to approve the package. The fear of forgoing the advantageous aspects induces parliament to approve. While this certainly helps to achieve agreements with something advantageous for everyone and to reach a compromise on contentious issues, the impression remains that it also allows negotiation agents to manipulate the approval by parliament.
Moreover, the issues included in the packages increasingly affect more areas than negotiators and parliamentarians ever dreamed of when drafting and approving the initial WTO agreements. 236 Since this shift in rule-making and the linkages with new areas outside trade are both complex and contentious, an ongoing policy dialogue with all actors will be essential. The WTO's current institutions seem not well-equipped for this broader task. Some proposals to enhance parliamentary control of the WTO have been made. In its resolution on the preparation of the Seattle conference, the European Parliament referred to the need for a permanent body to provide for parliamentary scrutiny. 237 The idea of a "consultative parliamentary assembly at the WTO" was advanced by Pascal LAMY, the EU Commissioner for Trade. 238 Moreover, former Director-General of the WTO Mike MOORE admits that parliamentarians have an essential role to play with regard to the ratification of the results of negotiations concluded in the WTO. 239 Such a parliamentary assembly was allegedly created at Seattle but was never composed. Nevertheless . While the WTO seems to recognize the importance of these meetings and encourages them, they still happen outside its institutional framework. 243 There was no reference to a consultative parliamentary assembly in the Ministerial Declaration at Doha 244 or in the Concluding Ministerial Declaration of Cancún. 245 In its resolution on the ministerial conference of Cancún the European Parliament called for 'enhanced democratic accountability and openness of the WTO and for the creation of a WTO Parliamentary Assembly'. 246 Looking at the difficult experiences the EU has been (and still is) facing when making the parliamentary assembly a real co-legislator 247 251 They can indeed make the WTO aware of the concerns of the very subjects of its decisions and help to fine-tune policies. As WTO competence touches increasingly more on issues where the WTO lacks expertise, the input by experts from the field may prove very useful. Moreover, input by civil society may add "fairness" to WTO decisions. Possibly affected parties will be able to express their views and will ensure that rules and principles are applied even-handedly over time and issues.
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It is also said that governments often only represent the position of the majority of a certain country. NGOs may collect minority views in separate countries and hence show that these views in fact enjoy a plurality of support at a global level and therefore represent voices that would otherwise not be heard.
Finally NGOs may be an additional source of ideas for policy-making and provide a fruitful intellectual competition to the governments in the WTO. 253 However, it is often warned that these NGOs may be representing narrow interests, backed by money from unveiled sources.
249 "The new de-restriction procedures represent a compromise between developed country Members such as the US, the EC and Canada, on the one hand, and some developing countries, including India and Malaysia, on the other. Industrialised countries had been pushing for automatic de-restriction of all documents, and one developed country source said that the EC was "less than enthusiastic" with the final decision, as it had been significantly watered down from previous proposals. These Members tend to post their own submitted documents on publicly-accessibly government websites. Some developing countries were less comfortable with releasing documents related to negotiating processes, saying they preferred to maintain the right to give their capitals time to review papers before circulation." See: http://www.ictsd.org/we-ekly/02-05-15/story1.htm. 250 See WTO document WT/GC/W/464/Rev.1. Where a delegation specifically requests that a document produced by the Secretariat be restricting, the waiting time for de-restriction has been reduced from eight months to 6-8 weeks. Under the new provisions, documents produced by the Secretariat can be restricted by the issuing body and will be de-restricted 60 days after the date of circulation. Members retain the right to restrict their own submitted documents, though they must renew their restriction requests monthly after an initial period of 60 days or until first consideration by the relevant body. 251 In pursuit of the objectives set out in the 1996 Guidelines, the Secretariat has been giving consideration to activities that might be carried out with NGOs. The basic objective of this programme of activities is to facilitate and encourage substantive and responsible discussion with NGOs on issues falling within the WTO's mandate. 257 The Secretariat has allowed the NGOs to participate in technical seminars and has organized stand-alone workshops. Large numbers of NGOs also try to attend WTO ministerial conferences.
political process [is] particularly questionable.'
261 There is indeed a genuine danger that 'Members overburden, and thus undermine, the dispute settlement system as a result of their inability to agree on (clearer) rules governing politically sensitive issues concerning international trade.' 262 The broad and active role of the Dispute Settlement System is equally causing problems of transparency and accountability. The dispute settlement organs of the WTO had to decide in recent years on politically sensible issues like environmental protection, public health and development policy, where they often lack expertise. The fierce reactions to decisions like USShrimp 263 and EC-Hormones 264 show the unease of many people with the current inaccessible dispute settlement system. Therefore, proposals have been made by the United States to open up the dispute settlement process for civil society and members not party to a dispute but with a legitimate interest in the case. 265 Moreover, the African Group submitted its own communication in September 2002. 266 The Group did not focus on transparency issues, but denounced the structural impediments for dispute settlement access for developing countries. As far as transparency is concerned, it confined itself to demanding technical and financial assistance for amicus curiae briefs. It rejected opening up the DSM to the public at this point in time.
267 India also filed a communication aimed at explicitly prohibiting panels and the Appellate Body to accept and consider unsolicited information and advice. 268 Moreover, the Appellate Body itself made a move towards more openness and accepted the right of panels and the Appellate Body to accept amicus curiae briefs filed by non-parties in its USShrimp 269 , US-Steel 270 and EC-Asbestos 271 decisions. These decisions faced fierce objections by the majority of Members. 272 Mostly developing countries feared that well-equipped organizations from industrial countries would unduly interfere in the dispute settlement process, thereby sidelining the parties themselves.
Costa Rica noted that 'such a measure represented a risk for developing countries as it would put them in a situation where they would be sort of possibilities of defence'. 273 Other objections include the possibility of trials by media and the risk of making the proceedings more burdensome. Nevertheless, the Panels and Appellate Body do not seem to be accepting large numbers of briefs because the briefs rarely meet the procedural requirements the Panels or Appellate Body set.
Surely, the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos did not rule that there is a duty to accept and comment on the briefs. 274 The Panels and the Appellate Body can easily reject them and do so often with vague reasons. 275 While it is undeniable that amicus curiae briefs can help the Dispute Settlement Bodies produce a well-elaborated upon decision, taking into account all interests, it should not be ignored that the NGOs and other interested parties that submit the briefs may represent only a narrow interest. 276 This common argument has already been qualified above. 277 There is an undeniable need for clearly elaborated criteria for amicus curiae brief-filing. These criteria can provide a certain filter for briefs being allowed. On the other hand, one should be aware that these criteria are not being used arbitrarily to restrict access. 282 The institutional structure should be 'such that even critics who disagree with the way the authority is exercised nonetheless accept the right of the institution to exercise its authority. ' 283 This is one of the most important challenges for the WTO. It should make it credible that its decisions are not solely advancing the interests of a few countries. 284 This becomes apparent when it is clear that the total welfare of all the citizens increases. Therefore it is important for the WTO to proceed on the Doha Development Agenda. In the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the Members vowed to 'seek to place [the] needs and interests [of the developing countries] at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.' 285 Citizens will only accept the legitimacy of the WTO if they realize they that they not only have access to and understand what is being decided in the organization, but also if they see evidence that the organization is ultimately promoting the welfare of everyone. A World Trade Organization that fails to deliver on the needs of the largest part of its Members, will never achieve such social legitimacy. The Members united in the WTO should prove that their promises are not hollow. If total welfare of the Members' population is indeed improved as a result of joining the WTO, the WTO will enjoy social legitimacy, even if some decisions do not seem to be in the immediate interest of a certain part of the world's population. 286 It also supposes that the institution has democratic structures (and this brings us back to formal legitimacy) that clearly inform people.
There is also a need for capacity-building for poorer countries so as to make them able to represent their citizens adequately within the WTO. NGOs may be a means for the WTO to communicate with people at the grassroots level. If people understand the system, they are less likely to react negatively to it. Citizens should be enabled to accept and understand that decisions made at the global (WTO) level are in the interest of all, even if they seem at first sight an infringement of their national sovereignty. 287 Such a process takes time and efforts by all actors; the WTO, governments, parliaments and civil society.
Conclusion
Only recently, the international community has realized, in the words of Thomas FRANCK, that "the natural right of all people to liberty and democracy is too precious and too vulnerable to be entrusted entirely to those who govern". 288 States and international organizations have boosted their assistance to other States aimed at strengthening the latter's' democratic tissue. To that end, they use a variety of sticks and carrots. International organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the OAS, or even private organizations, 289 assist States at their request to monitor elections. To help perform this monitoring, election standards have been drafted. States are sometimes required to push through democratic reforms so as to obtain membership of international organizations, NATO and the EU for instance, or to be entitled to financial support by these organizations.
The use of sticks is limited in international practice. At most, new undemocratic States or regimes fail to obtain recognition. For existing undemocratic States, the international community usually reserves a carrot approach. Attempts at upgrading democracy as hard law, which could even be militarily enforced by the Security Council or States ut singuli, are not only at loggerheads with principles of international law, chiefly sovereignty and non-intervention, but as well with the difficulty of imposing democracy. A flourishing democracy needs a bottom-up approach, an insight that is, once again, confirmed by the American-British occupation of Iraq. 290 In view of the Iraq debacle, powerful States will think twice when contemplating interventions exclusively based on pro-democratic arguments. However, there is room for pro-democratic intervention by invitation under international law, although the requirement of consent, even anticipatory, by a government held to be representative will not always be easy to meet.
Although democracy is increasingly preached in international relations, its status under international law remains uncertain. On the basis of the sovereignty principle, States continue to oppose certain interpretations of democracy. These rear guard actions, however, cannot conceal that the basic premise of democracy, the right to elections, is, despite or perhaps thanks to its vagueness, generally accepted and has attained the status of customary international law. 291 This view might be reinforced by the recent entry into force (May 2004) of the African Union's Protocol on the Peace and Security Council. It is heartening to see that a continent that was not particularly known for its democratic tenets now embraces the promotion and encouragement of democracy as one of its primary objectives and, importantly, is willing to impose sanctions in case the constitutional order of a Member State is overthrown.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe that the battle for democracy is over. Electoral democracy is still used improperly to legitimize authoritarian regimes. Referenda are staged in which voters can only vote in favour of or against one person, members of political parties are harassed and elections are systematically rigged. Therefore, the idea that a genuine democracy can only prosper when it is embedded in the rule of law providing sufficient legal protection gains ground. Nation-building projects in areas such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq indeed focus on stabilizing and strengthening state institutions under auspices of the international community. These efforts are to culminate in free and fair elections, paving the way for an effective and lasting democracy. 292 An account of democracy cannot be complete without a focus on international democracy. Aside from the emergence of national democracy, recent history has shown an exponential increase in international organizations. These organizations are, unlike most States, young and represent a wholly new form of governance and co-operation for mankind. From a democratic perspective, criticism of their functioning is evident. Yet the hope persists that, eventually, they too will draw their legitimacy from democratic representation. This transformation will be necessary, because achieving national democracy may turn out to be empty when all essential powers are transferred to the international level. Moreover, national policy-making is being influenced and curbed by commitments on higher levels (such as the WTO), even if, in principle, States maintain their whole sovereignty. Our case study on the World Trade Organization tried to indicate that if decision-making becomes multi-level, democracy also has to climb to all levels.
